

DEC 17 1926

The Classical Weekly

Published weekly, on Monday, except in weeks in which there is a legal or School holiday, from October 1 to May 31, at
Barnard College, New York City. Subscription price, \$2.00 per volume.
Entered as second-class matter, November 18, 1907, at the Post Office, New York, N. Y., under the Act of Congress of
March 3, 1879.
Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on
June 28, 1918.

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WHOLE No. 539

SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR LATIN GRAMMARS

(Concluded from page 62)

One of the most unsatisfactory sections in our Latin Grammars is that which treats of the dative with prepositional compounds. We are merely told that many verbs compounded with the prepositions *ad*, *ante*, *circum*, *com*, *in*, *inter*, *ob*, *post*, *prae*, *pro*, *sub*, *super*, may be used with the dative. But such a statement is not followed by any adequate explanation of the fundamental principle involved (though the fundamental principle involved is easily detected and easily formulated). No wonder that the student often uses the dative with *adiuvo*, *consumo*, and a host of other prepositional compounds that are never used with the dative. How can a good student who has mastered his grammar rules fail to use the dative with *adiuvo*, 'help'? One of his rules tells him that verbs meaning 'to help' are used with the dative, and another tells him that verbs compounded with *ad* are used with the dative. *Adiuvo* satisfies all the requirements of both these rules of which Grammars make so much. Still, *adiuvo* is used with the accusative, not with the dative.

There is another point in which the rule for prepositional compounds, as usually formulated, violates pedagogical principles. Instead of saying "Verbs compounded with *ad*, *ante*, *con*", etc., why not say, simply, 'Verbs compounded with any preposition except *per*, *praeter*, and *trans*', etc.? Such a list, containing but three prepositions, is only one-quarter as long as the list usually given. The rule would cover the ground fully, with a saving to the student of 75% in time and in energy¹.

In the treatment of the use of negatives, Grammars as a rule give students no adequate idea of the general and fundamental distinction between *non* and *neque* on the one hand and *ne* and *neve* on the other. The usual method of treatment is to give, under each of the numerous uses of the moods, the negative required by that particular use—something like this, for instance: (1) The usual negative is *non*; (2) Hortatory Subjunctive: the negative is *ne*; (3) Concessive Subjunctive: the negative is *ne*; (4) Optative Subjunctive: the negative is *ne*; (5) Deliberative Subjunctive: the negative is *non*; (6) Potential Subjunctive: the negative is *non*; (7) Prohibitive Subjunctive: the negative is *ne*; (8) Imperative: the negative is *ne*; (9) Clauses of Proviso: the negative is *ne*. The distinction between *neque* and

neve is similarly confused. Yet it is very easy to formulate a rule which will cover all these cases once for all without any repetition—a very short rule which any student can master at sight and which will guide him safely through the maze.

Another fault of some Grammars is a frequent tendency to state the facts of grammar in paragraph form, where they might be presented in tabular form. A table will often flash the facts into the pupil's mind quickly and effectually where a descriptive paragraph would require study and repeated reading. So a single glance at a famous painting (for instance) will give one a clearer conception of it than a dozen carefully written pages of description.

It has long seemed to me that the treatment of the sequence of tenses is one of the most unsatisfactory features of our present-day Grammars. The rule for sequence, as usually given, is inconsistent, self-contradictory, obscure, and unworkable at almost every point. Some of the so-called "exceptions" or "peculiarities" would not be exceptions or peculiarities at all if the rule were properly formulated. Who can make head or tail, for instance, out of the following contradictions found in one of our best and most popular Grammars (Bennett's)?

§ 258 states that the present-perfect indicative is a primary (principal) tense.

§ 268 states that the perfect indicative, even when it is translated in English by a present-perfect, is usually a secondary (historical) tense.

§ 267 states that the perfect subjunctive is a primary (principal) tense.

§ 268, 7, b, states that, in such sentences as *Nescio quid causae fuerit cur nullas ad me litteras dares*, the perfect subjunctive *fuerit* is a secondary (historical) tense, "as is shown by the following Imperfect Subjunctive". But the pupil has just learned from § 267 that this same *fuerit* is a primary (principal) tense used because a primary tense must follow the primary tense *nescio*. The student is here told that *fuerit* is both primary and secondary at one and the same time. This sentence is given in the Grammar as one of the "peculiarities" (exceptions) to the rule for sequence. In reality, there is nothing peculiar or exceptional about it. It is a perfectly normal Latin sentence in strict accord with the rule for sequence, when the rule is properly formulated.

§ 318 states that in subordinate clauses in indirect discourse the tense of the subjunctive is primary (principal) if the verb of saying is primary (principal). Then, in § 319, we have, as an illustration of this false claim, *Dico, si hoc crederes, te erravisse*, where the verb of saying is primary and the tense in the subordinate clause is secondary. Yet this sequence is in perfect

¹For the use of the dative with compound verbs see B. M. Allen, The Dative With Compound Verbs in Latin, THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 5.170-173; and two articles by Professor E. B. Lease, The Dative With Prepositional Compounds, American Journal of Philology 33.285-300, and Prepositional Compounds with the Dative in High-School Latin and the First Year in College, in The Classical Journal 8.7-17. See my remarks on these papers, in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 6.42. C. K. >

accord with the rule for sequence, when the rule is properly worded. The whole difficulty here is caused by the fact that the statement with which section 318 begins is not true.

§ 267, 3 runs as follows: "The Present and Imperfect Subjunctive <in the sequence of tenses> denote incomplete action, the Perfect and Pluperfect completed action, exactly as in the Indicative". This statement is either not true or not clear. The following sentences (one from Nepos, the other from Cicero) represent a perfectly normal use of the imperfect subjunctive in sequence: *Accidit ut omnes Hermae una nocte deicerentur*, 'It happened that all the Hermae were overthrown in a single night'; *Effeci ut Catilinam eicerem*, 'I brought it about that I banished Catiline'. Here the imperfect subjunctive refers in each case to one and the same act as the perfect indicative in the main clause. In what sense are *deicerentur* and *eicerem* more incomplete than *accidit* and *effeci*?

One of the most serious criticisms I have to pass on the usual treatment of the rule for sequence I have left to be considered last, the use of the terms primary, secondary, principal and historical. These terms have no meanings that make them in the least appropriate for the tenses to which they are applied in our Grammars. In connection with tenses, these words are wholly meaningless and wholly arbitrary. It would be quite as appropriate and quite as sensible to divide tenses into the white tenses and the black tenses as to divide them into primary and secondary.

A rule for sequence may easily be formulated that avoids all the objectionable features that I have pointed out—a much shorter rule than that usually given, one that is entirely free from arbitrary, technical terms, one that can be taken in and comprehended in less than a quarter of the time required by the old rule and, best of all, a rule that will work.

I have concerned myself above with a few illustrations of what seem to me unfortunate methods of presenting the essentials of Latin grammar. I wish to point out now some sections in our Grammars that involve, to my way of thinking, even more serious faults and some downright errors—some of them in fact errors so glaring that they will be immediately recognized as such as soon as attention is called to them.

For some strange and unaccountable reason, a statement has drifted down to us through the years, from Grammar to Grammar, that the Latin prepositions *in* and *sub* "with the accusative denote motion; with the ablative they denote rest". The absurdity of this rule will be evident in the translation into Latin of 'He was driving 60 miles an hour in Central Park'. Anyone familiar with even the rudiments of Latin syntax would of course know that "in Central Park" in this sentence must be translated by *in* with the ablative. But there would not be much 'rest' in driving 60 miles an hour. If a student should by chance ever translate such a sentence into Latin correctly, it would be in defiance of the Grammar rule he has learned, not because of it.

Another common rule of our Grammars says, "Place

where is regularly denoted by the ablative with a preposition". Of course in the vast majority of cases it can not possibly be expressed in any such way. Place where is most frequently expressed by the accusative with one or another of the following prepositions: *ante*, *apud*, *circa*, *circum*, *cis*, *citra*, *extra*, *infra*, *inter*, *intra*, *iuxta*, *per*, *post*, *praeter*, *prope*, *subter*, *super*, *supra*, *trans*, *ultra*. Of course the original framer of the rule intended to say 'place in or on which', but good intentions do not palliate the offence.

In the treatment of the syntax of the genitive in Bennett's Latin Grammar the very first use of the genitive forced upon the attention of the student is (§ 196) "Genitive of Origin: as,—*Marci filius*, the son of Marcus". What justification can there be for such classification? If, in *Marci filius*, *Marci* is genitive of origin, we must say that in *Marci pater*, *Marci frater*, *Marci avunculus*, etc., *Marci* is genitive of sonship, of brotherhood, of nephewhood, etc., respectively.

The second use of the genitive that is thrust upon the student is (§ 197) "Genitive of Material; as,—*talentum auri*, a talent of gold. . .". But *talentum* is not a coin or any other material thing. It merely indicates an amount or a quantity. It does not consist of material any more than do such abstract conceptions as size, bigness, etc. Even if *talentum* were a material thing, its material would not be likely to be expressed by the genitive *auri*. A 'ring of gold', for instance, is regularly *anulus aureus*, not *anulus auri*.

Another serious fault in our Grammars is found in the translations given in paradigms of the verbs. Some of these translations are responsible for giving students wrong conceptions which affect more or less disastrously their whole future work.

Almost (if not quite) without exception, students come to College with the idea that 'He is caught' may be translated by *Capitur*, 'He is wounded' by *Vulneratur*, 'He is armed' by *Armatur*, 'The city is destroyed' by *Urbs deletur*, 'The gate is closed' by *Porta clauditur*. This false conception is due entirely to the fact that the Grammars make no distinction between such verb-forms as those just mentioned and others that are quite different in sense, e.g. *amatur*, *regitur*, *auditur*, etc. These last expressions may with perfect propriety be translated by 'He is loved', 'He is ruled', 'He is heard', because these English translations are immediately understood as referring to an act that is going on in the present. But the corresponding forms of the verbs in the other list must be translated 'He is being wounded', 'He is being armed', 'The city is being destroyed', etc., since the English expressions 'He is wounded', 'He is armed', 'The city is destroyed', etc., would not denote any act at all, but in each case a present state resulting from a past act. 'He is wounded' can be translated only by *Vulneratus est*, 'He is armed' only by *Armatus est*, 'The city is destroyed' only by *Urbs deleta est*, etc.

Again, in the paradigms of the verbs, *amatus* is regularly translated by 'loved', *rectus* by 'ruled', *auditus* by 'heard', though none of these participles (normally) can have any such meaning, because the verbs from which they come refer to acts of such a sort

that when the acts have been completed they do not result in a corresponding state. When the act of loving a person, for instance, has been completed, the person is no longer a 'loved' person; when the act of 'ruling' a person has been completed, the person is no longer a 'ruled' person, etc. On the other hand, in the case of verbs of the other sort, the completion of the act does result in a corresponding state. When the act of arming a man has been completed, the man is an 'armed' man; when the act of wounding a man is completed, the man is a 'wounded' man; when the act of destroying a city is completed, the city is a 'destroyed' city. Here is a far-reaching principle of great importance—one that is constantly at work in all authors and at all periods of the language. Still no Grammar refers to it, so far as I know—and students are kept in complete ignorance of it throughout all their Latin studies.

It has long seemed to me that the so-called ablative of agency should be banished from Grammars. The treatment of this supposed use involves a treatment of the preposition *ab* (*a*) and its ablative case that is wholly unparalleled by, and wholly inconsistent with, the treatment accorded to all other cases and all other prepositions. The ablative case in itself does not have the power to express agency. There is no such thing anywhere in the Latin language. Agency is expressed by the preposition *ab* (*a*) with the ablative, and this preposition can of course govern nothing but the ablative case. But that is not the slightest reason why, in the phrase *ab amico*, 'by a friend', *amico* should be called ablative of agency. To call it so involves one in the utmost inconsistency in the treatment of all (or nearly all) the other prepositions. If we are to call *amico* the ablative of agency simply because the phrase *ab amico* denotes agency, then consistency will require us to add to the sections now found in our Grammars the following: accusative of means, because the phrase *per amicum* means 'by means of a friend'; accusative of cause, because *ob hanc rem* means 'because of this thing'; accusative of the thing near which, because *apud urbem* means 'near the city'; accusative of the thing before which, because *ante urbem* means 'before the city'; accusative of the things among which, because *inter urbes* means 'among the cities'; accusative of the thing above which, because *supra montem* means 'above the mountain'; and 25 other equally absurd sections (31 in all) to suit the various meaning of the other prepositions that are used with the accusative, *adversum*, *adversus*, *circum*, *circa*, *circiter*, *cis*, *citra*, *erga*, *extra*, *infra*, *intra*, *iuxta*, *penes*, *pone*, *prae*, *post*, *prope*, *propter*, *secundum*, *subter*, *super*, *trans*, *ultra*, *versus*. In addition to all this we shall, to be consistent, be obliged to add the following sections to those found in the syntax of the ablative: ablative of the thing without which, because *sine me* and *absque me* mean 'without me'; ablative of the person in the presence of whom, because *coram Caesare* means 'in the presence of Caesar'; ablative of the person concerning whom, because *de eo* means 'concerning him'; ablative of the thing before which, because *prae* (or *pro*) *templo* means 'before the temple';

ablative of the thing up to which, because *capulo tenus* means 'up to the hilt'.

Here are, in all, 36 new sections that we must, to be consistent, add to our Grammars if we are going to insist upon having an 'ablative of agency'. In all the 31 instances of the accusatives mentioned above every Grammar explains the accusative in each instance merely as one made necessary by the fact that the particular preposition concerned requires the accusative. Similarly with the ablatives in the prepositional phrases above mentioned, no one ever thinks of accounting for the ablative in such uses in any other way than by saying it is the object of the preposition, which requires the ablative. Why not say that agency is expressed by *ab* (*a*), just as we say that means is expressed by *per*, and that *ab* (*a*) is used with the ablative for the same reason that *per* is used with the accusative—simply because this particular preposition always requires that case?

Again I wish to call attention to the seriously misleading treatment, in our Latin Grammars, of the so-called Potential Subjunctive. This treatment has, in my opinion, been the means of corrupting the feeling of students for the real force of the mood. High School students—even the best of them—get the impression that 'I may have loved' may be translated into Latin by *Amaverim*, 'It may be asked' by *Quaeratur*, 'It may be true' by *Verum sit*, 'Who can doubt?' by *Quis dubitet?*, 'You can see', by *Videas*, etc.

Some years ago, in my monograph, *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses*³, I gave reasons for believing that the Latin subjunctive, unaided by *forsitan*, or (rarely) by *fortasse*, which ultimately usurped the functions of *forsitan*, never has the power of expressing the idea of 'may perhaps' or 'can' (= 'is able'). The arguments by which I supported this view were at first greeted by a storm of criticism both in this country and in Europe, but the tide now seems to have turned in my favor. I now have the support of Schmalz, one of the world's foremost authorities (if not the foremost authority) on Latin syntax. In the fourth edition of his *Lateinische Grammatik* (1910)⁴, under the head of Potentialis

³See Professor Knapp's discussion of this and related questions in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 2.97 (January 23, 1909).

⁴Published as Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, No. VI (1898). I may refer now to Professor Knapp's remarks in *American Journal of Philology* 32 (1911), 340-341, made in the course of his review of Bennett, *The Syntax of Early Latin*. Vol. I—The Verb. See also his note on *forsitan*, *Aeneid* 2.506.

<I venture to add that my convictions regarding the so-called Potential Subjunctive were reached in complete independence of Professor Elmer's views—indeed, long before I knew that he had any definite views on the subject. A passage often regarded as exhibiting a Potential Subjunctive (a 'may' subjunctive) is Horace, *Sermones* 1. 3. 19 *Nunc aliquis dicat mihi*. I remember that I wrote to Professor Elmer, many years ago, suggesting that this could perfectly well mean 'At this point let some one say to me', that is, in effect, 'Assuming, for the sake of argument, that some one says', etc. I added that, so long as this possible rendering was in entire harmony with the 'genius of the Latin language', no one had a right to cite the passage as a (definitive) example of the Potential Subjunctive. Professor Elmer replied that this explanation had never occurred to him. No one of us possesses all truth, or thinks of all possibilities—always. C. K.>

<See the volume entitled *Lateinische Grammatik*, part of Müller's *Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. In this Friedrich Stolz dealt with Laut- und Formenlehre, J. H. Schmalz with Syntax and Stilistik. Stolz's work has been revised by Manu Leumann and Joh. Bapt. Hofmann (Munich, Beck, 1926). Professor R. G. Kent has reviewed this revision, in *The Classical Journal* 22.69-74 (October, 1926). His review tells little about the book itself. It has, however, great value for its bibliographical information relative to the theme of the revised work. C. K.>

(§ 218, page 481) he summarizes my views regarding the so-called Potential Subjunctive, and, after referring to the attacks that had been made upon them, virtually accepts them in his own treatment of the potential. He discards all reference to the Latin subjunctive as ever having the power to express the ideas of 'may possibly' or 'can'. He makes no mention of *Aliquis dicat* or of *Aliquis dixerit*¹ in the supposed sense of 'Some one may say'. At least one other distinguished grammarian, Professor E. A. Sonnenschein, in his book, *A New Latin Grammar* (Oxford, 1912) discards all reference to any supposed 'may' potential or 'can' potential use of the Latin subjunctive. These are the first Latin Grammars, so far as I have noticed, that have not flaunted this supposed use of the subjunctive in the faces even of Preparatory School pupils, since the philosophy of Kant, more than 100 years ago, brought about the introduction into grammar of the subjunctive of possibility. Ever since my articles on the subject, twenty-five years ago, however, there has been a tendency among grammarians to narrow more and more the limits of the supposed use. Before that time 'very possibly' and 'can' were used at every turn in translating the Latin subjunctive, e. g. *Hoc confirmaverim*, 'This I can say' (Lane, § 1558), *Non laudaveris*, 'You can not praise' (Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 257), *Quaerat quispiam*, 'Some one may ask' (Allen and Greenough, who still retain, § 447, this discarded reading of a worthless manuscript). Bennett himself, one of my chief critics, admits (§ 280) that such a use is "confined mainly to a few phrases like those given as examples". Among his examples are *Dicat aliquis*, *Dixerit aliquis*. Many Grammars (e. g. Allen and Greenough, Hale-Buck, Harkness, D'Ooge, Schmalz) now discard even *Aliquis dixerit*. Roby, many years ago (in the Preface to the second volume of his *Latin Grammar*, ci-cvii), recognized the fact that this *dixerit* is not a subjunctive at all, but a future perfect indicative, though he might have made out a stronger case than he did in favor of his contention. In my *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* I proved beyond all possibility of doubt (so it seems to me) that Roby was right. The Grammars of Bennett and West, however, still cling to the exploded doctrine that *dixerit* is a perfect subjunctive.

While most of our best Grammars have now discarded *Aliquis dixerit* from their list of 'may'-potentials, most of them still retain, on the other hand, *Aliquis dicat* as an instance of such a use. There is, however, not a single instance of *Aliquis dicat* anywhere in High School Latin. *Aliquis dicat* is found only three times before Livy (twice in Terence, once in Horace²). It also occurs twice in Livy, once in Ovid, but nowhere else before the period of decline—a period for which I can not speak, as I have not examined it. All these five instances admit of interpretations other than as potentials. All syntacticians now admit at least the extreme rarity of any independent 'may'-potential subjunctive. Nevertheless Grammars are still giving to it as prominent a place as they give to any of the

most common uses of the Latin subjunctive. It is crammed down the throats of students who will never see it anywhere outside of their Grammars and composition books. These students get the impression that 'may perhaps do so and so' is legitimately and even regularly translated into Latin by the subjunctive. This false notion is further impressed upon them by the treatment accorded in some books to the perfect subjunctive. No sooner does a beginner come to the paradigm of his very first verb in some of these books (Bennett's Grammar, for instance) than he is told that the perfect subjunctive means 'I may have done so and so'. He gets the impression that *amaverim* means 'I may have loved' as regularly as *amo* means 'I love'. In the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Volume 32, and again in my *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses*, I pointed out that there is not a single instance of any such use anywhere in Latin literature from the earliest times down to the period of decline. The search by Sjöstrand and Clement disclosed no such use even in the period of decline. Such expressions as *Forsitan amaverim* occur, and such an expression may be translated 'I may have loved', just as *Fortasse amavi* may be translated by 'I may have loved' ('Perhaps I have loved'). But in the article above referred to I showed (conclusively, I think) that the subjunctive with *forsitan* (like the subjunctive with *haud scio an*, which dictionaries define as meaning 'perhaps') continued to be felt, from first to last, as a subjunctive of indirect question³ (in Silver Latin, once also apparently in Cicero, *fortasse* usurps the place of *forsitan* in this use). If anyone still chooses to think, in spite of the mass of proof I have adduced, that my interpretation of the subjunctive with *forsitan* is mere theory, very well, I am not particular on that point. But I must in any case insist upon the facts. One of these indisputable facts is that the perfect subjunctive unaided is, I repeat, not once used in the sense 'I may have done so and so' anywhere in Latin literature, at least before the period of decline (for which period I have no statistics). It is to be hoped that the example set by Schmalz in his *Lateinische Grammatik*, and by Sonnenschein, in his *A New Latin Grammar*, as regards the uses under discussion, may be followed by future Latin Grammars both in Europe and in America. If we can get rid of our 'may'-potentials and our 'can'-potentials, it will be a real blessing to future generations alike of Latin teachers and Latin students.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

HERBERT CHARLES ELMER

REVIEWS

A History of Greek Religion. By Martin P. Nilsson. Translated from the Swedish by F. J. Fielden. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch (1925). Pp. 310. \$4.25.

Professor Nilsson's book, *A History of Greek Religion*, is a most valuable contribution to the history of Greek religious thought. It consists of a lecture delivered before the University College of Wales at

¹See Note 3 above. C. K. >

²Again see Note 3 above. C. K. >

³See Professor Knapp on Aeneid 2.506.

Aberystwyth, and seven lectures delivered before the University of Uppsala. Each lecture, enlarged and revised, constitutes a chapter of the book. Endorsation of the volume by so eminent an authority in comparative religion as Sir James G. Frazer, who has written the Preface (2-6), is trustworthy assurance of its high quality. Moreover, what manner of scholar and writer Professor Nilsson is was clearly revealed long ago in his book, *Griechische Feste von Religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der Attischen* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1906).

The titles of the chapters indicate Professor Nilsson's originality of treatment, and cannot fail to rouse in the reader an expectation of studying a presentation and discussion that will be at once novel and stimulating. The reader, I may add, will not be disappointed, unless he expects the author to solve problems which probably never will be completely solved.

The contents are as follows:

I. Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion (9-37); II. Origins of Greek Mythology (38-75); III. Primitive Belief and Ritual (76-104); IV. Gods of Nature and of Human Life (105-133); V. The Homeric Anthropomorphism and Rationalism (134-179); VI. Legalism and Mysticism (180-223); VII. The Civic Religion (224-262); VIII. The Religion of the Cultured Classes and the Religion of the Peasants (263-304); Index (305-310).

Professor Nilsson's successful handling of his subject challenges a reviewer to discuss the chapters individually, but second thought brings the conviction that such a discussion would compel him, in order to be just, virtually to rewrite the book, or, perhaps, to write another book containing a large measure of commendation combined with a smaller measure of rebuttal. It is wise, therefore, to confine the review to a few comments of a more general nature and to several citations for the purpose of illustration.

One cannot help observing with a great deal of admiration that, in a field where it is easy to allow the imagination to run riot in a frenzy of conjecture, the author exhibits a most laudable caution and imposes upon himself an effective restraint. In the first chapter this quality is especially noticeable. Of late years many hasty and unwarranted deductions have been made from the material remains of the Minoan-Mycenaean period. Professor Nilsson, however, plunges to no conclusions without first ascertaining the depth of the water; a few times, to be sure, he seems to plunge, but only with knowledge of the soundings. For example, he is slow to draw inferences from our still indefinite knowledge of the race and the language of the Hittites (11); he refuses to run the risk of doing violence to the evidence by attempting to reduce the explanations of the figures of the Minoan female divinity to a single formula. Moreover, his caution leads him to scrutinize certain generally accepted opinions concerning the Minoan Age. To be specific, he cannot regard the double-axe as the thunderbolt, but on the contrary explains it as the sacrificial axe with which the sacred ox was killed (15-16). He declines to believe that there is evidence to show that there was any religious significance in the bull-fights depicted in so many Minoan

remains (21). He rejects the lion-daemons by affirming his belief that the figures commonly thus named represent human beings ritually disguised as animals (20). He breaks with the traditional view of the development of the Greek pantheon (116-118), holding that "it is the needs of man that create the gods" (116). The book contains many other such instances of independence and sanity of judgment, and nowhere are there more or better instances than in the passages in which the author deals with the origins of Greek mythology. As man's nature is manifold, so he accounts for the vast number and varieties of Greek myths in a multiplicity of ways.

Though generally cautious, Professor Nilsson is not entirely free from dogmatism that sometimes may be justly called 'cocksureness'. When he states that the name of Hermes is "one of the few that are etymologically transparent" (109), he fails to use the qualification 'seems', and may thereby be as guilty of following an easy 'Volksetymologie', as were many of the Greeks themselves in an age when making etymologies was a popular fashion. If Professor Frothingham's contention (*American Journal of Archaeology* 20 [1916], 175-211) is correct that the Mesopotamian Ningishzida and Hermes were originally identical, then the name of Hermes, which Professor Nilsson regards as of transparent meaning, probably signifies 'he of the right hand scepter (or pillar)', rather than 'he of the stone-heap'. Again, it is at least debatable whether (276) "In the Hermes and Cnidian Aphrodite of Praxiteles there is not a spark of anything religious except the beauty..."

Professor Nilsson is a philosopher, or, at any rate, argues like one, which is probably the same thing. Many a student of Greek life has found it difficult to understand the Greek conception of *εἶδος*, but no one who reads Professor Nilsson's argument upon this subject in Chapter V (152-153, 158-159) and Chapter VII (227-231) will any longer have an excuse for failing to appreciate this peculiarly Greek point of view of the gods and of human life and conduct. With similar skill he presents the problem of the relations of the gods and Fate (167-172), and thereby gives real assistance to the reader of Homer and the great tragic writers. His discussion of the significance of the practices of burial and cremation (99-102) is a model of logical inference.

The indefiniteness and paucity of the evidence in many phases of Greek religion are such as to invite prolixity. The author of this book, however, apparently fearful of yielding to this tendency, has so shrunk away from it that he has gone to the opposite extreme of compressing his material into small compass. Sometimes his meaning is obscure, so folded up are the successive steps of his argument. The reader ought not to be left to draw his own inferences as he is, for instance, on page 90 in these sentences:

... Zeus' fleece, the much-discussed *Διὸς κρόδιον*, belongs to 'the boisterous Zeus' (*Μαιμακτής*). I am inclined to think that in these rites lies the key to the explanation of the myth of the Golden Fleece; it is associated with the Zeus of Mount Laphystion.

Again, why is that puzzling race of creatures, the Cen-

taurs, dismissed with so tantalizingly brief a remark as that on page 111?

In the main, the translator has done his work admirably; he will easily be forgiven for a few passages whose awkwardness makes them somewhat hard to follow but whose meaning is nevertheless not ultimately doubtful.

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Greek Philosophy: An Introduction. By Margaret E. J. Taylor. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch (1924). Pp. 143. \$1.00.

Of the very difficult kinds of books to write the most difficult are the Encyclopaedia and the Manual. The Encyclopaedia is nothing if it is not really encyclopedic and the Manual is worthless as such if it is not compressed. The act of compression involves such a strict limitation of selection and treatment of material that the reviewer or the reader of a manual should take unusual pains to understand the author's point of view and intentions, and the appraisal of the book ought to be made largely in reference to these two particulars. In the very nature of the case the author's statement of the scope of this kind of work is apologetic, in the Greek meaning of the term. In reviewing Miss Taylor's little book, *Greek Philosophy*, a volume of *The World's Manuals*, we do but justice to the author when we put before ourselves at the outset at least a part of her Preface (5-6):

This little book is not intended for philosophers or for advanced students of philosophy. It is an attempt to meet the need of a class of readers who have not hitherto received much consideration—men and women of average education who wish to know something about the aims of the Greek Philosophers and the substance of their teaching, but are repelled alike by the conciseness of ordinary handbooks and by the length and difficulty of larger and more learned works. The very nature of the attempt involves many limitations of scope and treatment, of which no one is more conscious than the writer... what is here presented is but a selection from a wide field of choice: much that is important for the serious student has been omitted as incompatible with the immediate aim.... The writer's endeavour has been to include that which possesses in the highest degree an interest at once permanent, universal, and human.... It seemed that the purpose of the book would be better served by giving an account of each philosopher from a single point of view than by presenting a bewildering variety of theories to readers who are not in a position to decide between them.... in treating this subject with such a purpose as has been indicated, it is necessary to introduce a large element of interpretation. A mere statement of the recorded opinions of the different Greek philosophers would be useless and meaningless to the readers to whom it is hoped that this book may find its way....

The story of Greek philosophy has been told so many times that its plot is crystallized, and one who ventures to tell it again finds his freedom limited to deciding the degree of emphasis to be placed upon this or that detail. Thus some writers have stressed the pre-Socratic philosophers, others Plato, still others Aristotle, each according to his special interest. A few, like Miss Taylor, have so sunk their personal predi-

lections out of sight that they have distributed their attention in proportion to the importance that each period or each philosopher has to Greek philosophy as a whole and to the history of human thought. This is one of the great merits of the manual we are reviewing.

Novices to Greek philosophy have always questioned the right of Thales and Heraclitus, for example, to be called philosophers. Miss Taylor very sympathetically removes the doubt (12-17, 22-28) and thus paves the way for a gradual approach to an appreciation of Plato; moreover, she does this without binding herself to a real or imaginary chronological series of philosophers or philosophies. Her elasticity in this respect is quite in harmony with the irregular sequence of thought connecting period and period of any people's history and development. As only a few persons are by nature metaphysically minded, Parmenides has always been a puzzle to the great majority of students; but with this manual before him every one except a dullard will in the future have at least a working knowledge of what Parmenides, and after him Plato, meant by 'to be', 'not to be' and 'becoming'. As a good example of the author's lucid manner of exposition I quote a few lines (29) from her chapter on The Verb 'to be' (28-32):

... The truth about *what is* can only be reached by thinking, and anything that contradicts the results of thought must be untrue. The world as it seems to us in our everyday experience does contradict the results of thought. It tells us that *what is* changes, while thought tells us that what is cannot change. The ordinary world then is unreal: we cannot *know* anything about it; for all that can be known is simply what can be thought out as to the nature of *what is*....

It is very evident even to the casual reader that Miss Taylor has written her book thoughtfully and has not merely compiled the stock theories and beliefs concerning the Greek philosophers. For example, it has become almost a fashion among the admirers of Socrates to declare that, if he were living in these days when natural science is supreme, his attitude toward the study of nature would be the modern attitude. But Miss Taylor knows Socrates too well to believe or repeat the statement; her own admirably expressed opinion is probably the true appraisal of Socrates in this respect (71):

... The main reason why he gave up the study of nature was that he believed the processes of nature to be beyond man's control, and therefore to have no bearing on the life of man. If he had lived in modern days he might have changed his mind as to the possibility of man's control of nature, but that would not necessarily have affected his general view of the comparative unimportance of scientific study. For though man's increased control of natural forces has immensely altered the externals of life, it has made little difference to life itself. Men and women are not better as men and women because they can fly in aeroplanes, or communicate by wireless telegraphy, or blow one another up with explosives. The knowledge that matters, because it bears on life and goodness, is not natural science. Nor is it book-learning. The most learned man is not necessarily the best man. The true knowledge for men must be something that makes men good as men....

Altogether the book is to be regarded as a worthy addition to existing manuals in the various departments

of classical study. It is hard to say to whom it will be the more useful, the classical or the non-classical student. In any case, its simple, clear statement of the problems of Greek philosophy and its lack of technical jargon will tend to give the non-classical student the unique point of view of the ancient Greek thinkers.

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A SPECIAL USE OF MEDIEVAL LATIN FOR COLLEGE FRESHMEN¹

Professor Knapp's statements, in his editorial, *Medieval Latin Not for Beginners in Latin* (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.1-3, 9-10) deserve, in general, only the most heartfelt approval. Certainly, if the study of Latin is to lead to intimate acquaintance with the spiritual and the material life of the nation which spoke Latin, we must introduce the student to the literature in which that life finds its expression, and preferably through the greatest writers of that literature. Assuredly, nobody would recommend Barlaam and Josaphat as reading material for the study of Greek. It is true, on the other hand, that divinity students can probably best learn Greek by reading the New Testament. But that is a specialized purpose. In the same way, I find usefulness in medieval Latin for specialized study. At Hunter College, at least, we have recently found medieval Latin, in the short selections of a book by Messrs. Clark and Game² a very valuable vehicle for a distinct and specialized purpose.

Our curriculum demands from every student one year's occupation with that one of three languages—French, German, Latin—which she did not pursue in the Preparatory School. Until 1925, Freshmen who, under these circumstances, began Latin in Hunter College, worked through one of the regular *Beginners' Books*, and then read selections from Caesar's *Gallic War*. The classes usually were dissatisfied with a task in which they lacked interest, and so were unsatisfactory to their teachers. So we resolved on a new departure. Dr. L. E. Wilkins, Supervisor of Modern Foreign Languages for the New York City Department

¹In the interest of clearness, I wish to point out, in set terms, what is implied, more than once, in Dr. Riess's remarks—namely, that in this paper he is concerned with something that differs *loilo caelo* from what I was talking about in my editorial in the first two numbers of the current volume of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY. It ought to be plain to every one—though I wish now that I had said so in specific terms—that by the word "Beginners" I meant High School pupils. The pupils with whom Dr. Riess and his coadjutors at Hunter College are dealing are *four years at least beyond the pupils I had in mind*.

Dr. Riess makes it plain, especially at the close of his paper, that the contents, atmosphere, purposes, and results of the course at Hunter College are very different from the contents, atmosphere, purposes, and results of a course in Latin for Beginners conducted by what some would call the 'traditional' or 'old' method of teaching Latin, but I should call the tried, tested, proven, and so *normal* method of teaching Latin. I am myself convinced that, when the normal method meets—what it richly deserves—from teachers and pupils the same enthusiasm which the course at Hunter College enjoys at the hands and the minds of teachers and taught, the results, for beginners of the High School age, or for beginners of the Freshman College age, are of more value than the results obtainable by any substitute. C. K. >

²Medieval and Late Latin Selections for the Use of College Students, by Charles Upson Clark and Josiah Bethen Game (Chicago, Mentzer, Bush, and Company, 1925. See THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.56-57).

of Education, was kind enough to furnish to us the prescribed High School Word-Lists in French and in Spanish. To these lists we added the Latin originals, regardless of their occurrence or non-occurrence in literary Latin, and from them we compiled a new word-list of Latin vocables common to both modern language lists, a 'thesaurus' of approximately eight hundred words. The mere work of compilation was instructive to the maker, for a comparison with the Latin list prescribed by the Board of Regents showed that about one-third of the words occurred there also.

With this word-list as a foundation, we constructed a body of lessons for our work. The aim was always to appeal to the 'apperceptive mass', the knowledge of French, Spanish, and, occasionally, German, in the possession of the students. In view of the greater maturity of College Freshmen, we started with a chapter on changes in sounds and in forms. On entering the class-room for the first time, the students found themselves facing a piece of early French. For practical reasons we chose the Oath of Strassburg, given in 842 by Charles the Bald to Lewis the German. Beneath this old French, there was written the modern French version, and following it a rendering into Latin. The students easily recognized the relation of the three pieces and participated eagerly in tracing the changes from Latin through early French to the French of our own days.

After learning that the accusative in late Latin had replaced the nominative, the students learned these two cases for the first three declensions in Latin. They soon added to these the dative, then the genitive, and, finally, the ablative, but they never began with the Latin, but always with the modern expressions. The verb was treated in a similar manner. By the middle of the second semester the classes possessed a knowledge of practically every topic taught in the ordinary *Beginners' Books*, but possessed this much more firmly because it had been closely bound up with their past experience and because the mastery of the vocabulary, thanks to its close resemblance to the one they knew, presented but little difficulty. Where, formerly, students had been hurried through sixty-five or seventy lessons, we succeeded in condensing the material into twenty-six chapters, to each of which we were able to devote almost three hour-periods, and in which we could embody copious translation exercises—never less than from fifteen to twenty fairly long Latin sentences on modern topics—simple conversation, and much work in tracing modern English vocabulary.

From an early point in the work, we introduced short and simple selections from the book mentioned. The last six or eight weeks were given over entirely to reading—in class and at sight—about fifteen pages, used as material for conversation and for review of grammar. This is now the third time that we have organized these classes, not only in the regular College, but also in our Evening and Extension Sessions, as well as in the Summer School. At present, ten different instructors are handling the work, so that it can no longer be credited to the enthusiasm of the originator.

In addition, one outside institution has asked for our consent to a trial.

As far as we are able to judge, the labor of making the course has been repaid many times over in the keen interest of the students and in the satisfaction of the instructors: neither students nor instructors wear that tired and indifferent look any more. Of course, we realize perfectly that this is not the study of Latin in the traditional sense; but it has served our specialized purpose very well. Indications are not lacking that it may be possible for some students, linguistically gifted, to make the transition into further study of 'real' Latin without undue difficulty. We could not have done this, had we not had ready for our use material such as medieval Latin furnishes, of a character related to modern foreign language work.

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ERNST RIESS

ONCE MORE ON THE USE OF SAND AS A BLOTTER

IN THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.8, Mr. H. E. Wedeck has made a further note on the use of sand as a blotter.

Sand was used for drying ink in modern Greece as late as 1912. In villages it was a common thing. For instance, the school children of Keramidion¹ in Thessaly, near Volo, generally used sand. The quality of the blotting-paper was not so good—in fact some blotters did not absorb any more ink than the paper upon which the writing was done—and sand was used by preference to avoid spreading of the ink. The two schoolmasters of the village also used sand, which they kept in inkwells made for the purpose, with one bottle like a salt-shaker.

At some distance from Keramidion, toward the north, there are whole hills of sandstone with sand deposits of yellow, reddish, and green color. This sand is somewhat finer than the regular sea-sand and is prized very much by the school children. River-sand was not used at all.

In 1912, in a town of over twenty thousand inhabitants, situated near the site of the ancient Pagasae, I once saw a merchant in his office use sand to dry the letters which he wrote. His inkwell was similar to those of the schoolmasters. The manufacture of such inkwells argues a somewhat common custom. Doubtless other schoolmasters and merchants in modern Greece

¹Keramidion is about twenty miles from Volo, to the north. It is situated about two miles inland, southwest of the ancient village Kasthanaia, and is the capital of the deme bearing the ancient name—Keramidion Tou Demon Kasthanaia. According to tradition, the Church of this village was built first. It bears the date of 1816. The village, however, was transferred from another place, presumably a village of the same name further inland, about nine miles from the sea, facing toward Lake Boeveis in the plain of Thessaly, now commonly called, by the natives, Karla Lake.

The site of Kasthanaia is on the sea-shore. It is at present called Hagios Ioannes, or St. John, from a little Chapel dedicated to that Saint. There is a cyclopean wall on the site, with regular rectangular blocks, at the foot of the high hill which projects sheer into a cliff washed by the sea. Many remains from neolithic times have been found by the native vine-cultivators there, such as mortars and pestles and other utensils, which are quite smooth in workmanship. The cyclopean wall is in a deep place; whether the place is naturally deep or was excavated by the builders it is hard to say. So far as I know, no excavation took place there.

used, and probably are still using, sand. It would be natural to suppose that sand was generally used in ancient Greece and Rome as a blotter, and that the use of it in modern Greece is a survival.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY CHRISTOPHER G. BROUZAS

CLASSICAL ARTICLES IN NON-CLASSICAL PERIODICALS

III

American Historical Review—April, Review, favorable, by M. Rostovtzeff, of V. Gordon Childe, *The Dawn of European Civilization*; Review, favorable, by W. S. Ferguson, of Rachel L. Sargent, *The Size of the Slave Population at Athens During the Fifth and Fourth Centuries Before Christ*.

Art and Archaeology—August, Review, favorable, but too sketchy to be of real value, by R. V. D. Magoffin, of Ida Thallon Hill, *Rome of the Kings, An Archaeological Setting for Livy and Vergil*.—September, Meunier, *A Modern Sculptor in the Greek Tradition*, Walter R. Agard; Review, favorable, by Cornelia G. Harcum, of Thomas Ashby, *Turner's Visions of Rome*; Review, by Henry S. Washington, of Byron Khun de Prorok, *Digging for Lost African Gods* [the book deals, inter alia, with excavations on the supposed sites of ancient Carthage, Utica, etc. Professor Washington doubts, strongly, whether any remains of Punic Carthage are to be found on the site at which, in 1925, Professor Kelsey and others excavated (see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.43). He attaches little importance to the Punic cemetery then explored, and doubts if there is a sanctuary of Tanit near by. He thinks it more likely that the real site of ancient Punic Carthage is rather at Gamart, some miles to the north. He also thinks it would be much more worth while to excavate on the site of ancient Utica]; Review, favorable, by Charles Upson Clark, of R. E. M. Wheeler, *Prehistoric and Roman Wales*.—October, *What Rome Contains in Illustration of the History of Art*, William Sener Rusk [illustrated]; *The December Excavations at Nemea*, Carl R. Blegen [illustrated]; *The Head of Sappho on the Cover* <of this Issue>, David M. Robinson; Review, favorable, by Rexford Newcomb, of G. T. Rivoira, *Roman Architecture and Its Principles of Construction Under the Empire*, Translated, from the Italian, by G. Mc N. Rushforth; Review, favorable, but all too brief, by W. R. Agard, of E. Norman Gardiner, *Olympia, Its History and Remains*.—November, unsigned, of Guido Calza, *Ostia, An Historical Guide to the Monuments*, as translated by R. Weeden-Cooke [the book itself is praised: the translation is not: "It is a great pity that Mr. Weeden-Cooke's English and punctuation are at times so faulty"]].

Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics—April, *The Problem of the Origin of Serfdom in the Roman Empire*, M. Rostovtzeff.

CHARLES KNAPP.